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SUPREME COURT WATCH: RECENT DECISIONS AND UPCOMING CRIMINAL
CASES FOR THE 2007-2008 DOCKET
Jedidiah Sorokin-Altmann*
Lawrence v. Florida
127 S. Ct. 1079
Decided February 20, 2007
Questions Presented:
1.
Does the one-year statute of limitations period of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act deny habeas
relief?
2.
Does the confusion around the statute of limitations, as
evidenced by a circuit split, constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” that would entitle defendants to equitable tolling
during the time when their claim is considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court on certiorari?
Facts:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) limits the ability of death row inmates to apply for
habeas relief. It bars federal courts from considering habeas
petitions unless the state court has “unreasonably” interpreted
the constitution in finding the prisoner guilty, and it carries a
one-year statute of limitations on habeas appeals in federal
court.
Gary Lawrence was convicted of first-degree murder
in March 1995; he was given the death penalty, and the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in August 1997. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 20, 1998. On
January 19, 1999, 364 days later, Lawrence filed an application
for state postconviction relief in a Florida trial court. The court
denied relief, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on
November 18, 2002, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari
on March 24, 2003. While Lawrence’s petition for certiorari
was pending, he filed the federal habeas application that is the
subject of this case. All but one day of the limitations period
lapsed during the 364 days between when Lawrence’s conviction became final and when he filed for state postconviction
relief. After the Florida Supreme Court denied him postconviction relief, Lawrence waited another 113 days to file his federal habeas application, well beyond the one day he had remaining. Hence, his habeas application can be considered timely
only if the limitations period was tolled during the Supreme
Court’s consideration of his petition for certiorari.
Decision:
In a 5-4 ruling, with Justice Clarence Thomas writing
the majority decision, the Supreme Court held that AEDPA does
not toll the one year limitations period while the Court considers a certiorari petition. The majority opinion states “[r]ead naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the application...[A] state postconviction application remains pending until
the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s
postconviction procedures. This Court is not part of a State’s
postconviction procedures.” (internal quotations omitted). To
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exhaust state remedies, petition for certiorari is not required.
AEDPA is designed to “encourage litigants [to] first exhaust all
state remedies and then to file their federal habeas petitions as
soon as possible.”
The majority opinion held that “Lawrence ha[d] fallen
far short of showing [the] ‘extraordinary circumstances’ necessary to support equitable tolling.” The Court held that the
Circuits that addressed the AEDPA limitations issue at the time
Lawrence’s limitations period expired all agreed that the period
was not tolled by certiorari petitions. The circuit split developed
later. The Court also rejected Lawrence’s argument that his
attorney’s mistake in miscalculating the limit entitled him to
equitable tolling because such an argument would lead to equitable toll limitations periods for every person whose attorney
missed a deadline. The Court also rejected Lawrence’s claim
based on mental incapacity and on the State appointing his
counsel, holding that Lawrence failed to make a factual showing of mental incapacity and that a State’s assisting prisoners in
postconviction proceedings does not render them responsible
for a prisoner’s delay.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice
Souter, and Justice Bryer, dissented.
Whorton v. Bockting
127 S. Ct. 1173
Decided February 28, 2007
Question Presented:
Did Crawford announce a rule of criminal procedure
that falls within the Teague exception for watershed rules?
Facts:
Marvin Bockting was accused of sexually assaulting
his six-year-old step-daughter. At trial, the court determined
that the child was too distressed to be sworn in, and the court
proceeded under a Nevada statute that allowed the out-of court
statements, made by a child under ten years of age describing
acts of sexual assault or physical abuse, to be admitted if the
court finds the child is unavailable or unable to testify and that
“the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Over
defense counsel’s objection, a detective and the victim’s mother were permitted to recount the victim’s statements at trial.
Bockting appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court,
which issued a final decision in 1993, holding that based on
Ohio v. Roberts, the statement was constitutionally admissible
because the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements provided “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
Bockting filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the
District Court, which denied his petition because the Nevada
Supreme Court’s decision “was not ‘contrary to’ and did not
‘involve an unreasonable application of, clearly establish
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
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States.’” Bockting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. While this action was pending before the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford,
overruling Roberts, and holding that “testimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” (internal citations omitted).
On appeal from the denial of his habeas petition,
Bockting contended that had the rule of Crawford been applied
to his case, the victim’s statements would not have come into
evidence and he would not have been convicted. He argued that
Crawford should have been applied to his case under one of
two theories: first, that Crawford was an old rule in existence at
the time of his conviction, or second, that Crawford was a
“watershed” rule that implicated the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceedings.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the
District Court, and held that Crawford does apply retroactively
to cases on collateral review.
Decision:
Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that Crawford does not apply retroactively. The Court stated that Crawford did not merely apply an old
rule; Crawford explicitly overturned the old rule of Roberts.
Crawford and Roberts are directly contradictory, and hence
Crawford is undoubtedly a new rule. As a new rule that is procedural and not substantive, Crawford is not applied retroactively unless it is a “watershed rule of criminal procedure.”
Watershed rules are those that (1) are necessary to prevent “an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction” and (2)
“alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” The Court held that
the Crawford rule does not meet the first requirement relating
to an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. The
Court compared the Crawford rule to that of Gideon, the only
case that has qualified under this exception thus far, and held
that the Crawford rule is “much more limited in scope, and the
relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the factfinding
process is far less direct and profound.” The Court stated that
the Crawford rule was aimed at instituting the original understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause and not
necessarily improving the accuracy of factfinding in criminal
trials. The Court also noted that the Crawford rule did not alter
the understanding of bedrock procedural elements.
James v. United States
127 S. Ct. 1586
Decided April 18, 2007
Question Presented:
Can a conviction for attempted burglary qualify as a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Facts (written by Andrew Myerberg):
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a
mandatory fifteen (15) year sentence on defendants who are
arrested for possession of a firearm and have been previously
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convicted of three “serious drug crimes” or “violent felonies.”
In 2003, Alphonso James, Jr. was arrested and tried in federal
district court in Florida for possession of a firearm. On his
record, James had a previous conviction for attempted burglary
and two previous convictions for drug trafficking. The government moved for enhanced sentencing because the convictions
for trafficking and attempted burglary fell under the scope of
the ACCA as “serious drug crimes” and “violent felonies.”
James objected, arguing that attempted burglary was not a “violent felony” and that one of his drug trafficking convictions
could not be classified as a “serious drug crime.” The district
court ruled in favor of James, holding that because the challenged drug trafficking conviction was not a “serious drug
crime,” James only had two convictions for the purposes of the
ACCA and, thus, the government could not move for enhanced
sentencing under the statute.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the
judgment of the district court. The Eleventh Circuit held that
the challenged drug trafficking conviction was, in fact, a “serious drug crime.” Further, the court agreed with the district
court that attempted burglary was a “violent crime” under the
ACCA, resulting in a circuit split between the Eleventh and the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Consequently, James was deemed to
qualify under the statute for enhanced punishment.
Decision:
Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion in this
5-4 ruling, affirming the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that a criminal conviction for attempted burglary does constitute a “violent
felony.” The majority rejected James’s argument that the
statute’s text and structure excluded attempt offenses from the
residual provision’s scope. They also rejected his reliance on
the legislative history of the 1984 provision, holding that the
1986 amendments broadened the scope of the residual clause.
The majority held that the risk posed by attempted burglary was
no different than that of a completed burglary – the harm comes
from the possibility that an innocent person might appear while
the crime is in progress. Given Florida’s law, the Court held
that this is sufficient to constitute a “violence felony” under the
residual provision. Justices Scalia, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Thomas dissented.
Scott v. Harris
127 S. Ct. 1769
Decided April 30, 2007
Question Presented:
Does a police officer who ends a high speed chase by
crashing his car into that of the suspect violate the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures? Is it
“clearly established” under federal law that an officer using
deadly force in a high speed chase constitutes a violation of the
Fourth Amendment?
Facts (written by Andrew Myerberg):
During a high speed chase, Officer Timothy Scott
rammed his vehicle into that of a nineteen-year-old fleeing
speeder, Victor Harris. The impact caused Harris’ car to crash.
As a result of the crash, Harris was paralyzed from the neck
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down. Harris filed suit in the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, alleging that Scott violated his Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure by
using excessive force. The District Court ruled for Harris, holding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment against Officer Scott, citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S.1 (1985), for the proposition that deadly force could not be
used to perform a seizure unless the suspect’s actions presented
a “significant threat of death” to the public. The court held that
speeding and traffic violations on mostly empty roads did not
meet that threshold.
Decision:
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion for
this 8-1 decision. The court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, and
held that “[a] police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when
it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”
Instead of relying on the facts as adopted by the Court of
Appeals, Scalia’s majority opinion relies on the fifteen minute
videotape of the chase, available on the Supreme Court’s website and in the Clerk of Court’s case file. The majority opinion
notes that the respondent’s vehicle was “shockingly fast” and
“[f]ar from being the cautious and controlled driver the lower
court depict[ed]...the video more closely resembles a
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort...”
Uttecht v. Brown
127 S. Ct. 2218
Decided June 4, 2007
Questions Presented:
Did the Ninth Circuit err by not deferring to the trial
judge's observations regarding a prospective juror's views on
the death penalty? Did the Ninth Circuit err by reversing the
trial court on the grounds the decision was contrary to established federal law, in lieu of applying the statutory presumption
of correctness?
Facts:
Cal Coburn Brown robbed, raped, tortured, and murdered one woman in Washington State, and two days later,
robbed, raped, tortured, and attempted to murder a second
woman in California. Once apprehended, he confessed, and
pled guilty to the California crime. Washington sought the death
penalty and brought Brown to trial. Several potential jurors
were dismissed for cause, the ones of concern in this case were
referred to in the Court's decision as Jurors X, Y, and Z. Jurors
X and Y were excused over the defense's objections. Juror Z
said he was capable of following the law and his oath as a juror,
but the State argued that the voir dire revealed that he misunderstood his responsibilities as a juror and possessed “an attitude
toward capital punishment that could have prevented him from
returning a death sentence under the facts of this case,” despite
having no general opposition to the death penalty. The court
dismissed Juror Z. Based on the jury's verdicts in the guilt and
sentencing phases of the trial, the trial court sentenced Brown
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to death, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington.
Brown filed a habeas petition in federal district court,
which denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the state trial court violated Brown's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by excusing Juror Z, despite Brown's failure
to object at the time.
Decision:
Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the court's 5-4
decision, reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling. The Court held
that the Ninth Circuit was wrong when it claimed the
Washington Supreme Court applied the wrong standard of
review. The trial court explicitly found that Jurors X, Y, and Z
were substantially impaired or unable to follow the court's
instructions and abide by their oaths as jurors, and the Supreme
Court held that the Ninth Circuit was mistaken in overlooking
or disregarding this finding. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion stated, “we conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion in granting the State's motion to excuse Juror Z.”
Justice Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
Bowles v. Russell
127 S. Ct. 2360
Decided June 14, 2007
Questions Presented:
Are the time limits for filing a notice of appeal jurisdictional in nature? If so, can a defendant maintain an appeal
under the extraordinary circumstances doctrine where the trial
judge miscalculated the deadlines as required by Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 4(a)(6) and Section 2107(c), and gave the defendant seventeen days instead of fourteen in which to file a notice of
appeal?
Facts:
In 1999, Keith Bowles was convicted of murder for his
involvement in a beating death. He was sentenced to fifteen
years to life. He unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and
sentence on direct appeal. On September 5, 2002, he filed a federal habeas petition. On September 9, 2003, the District Court
denied Bowles's petition. After the entry of final judgment,
Bowles had thirty days to file a notice of appeal under Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), and he
failed to do so. On December 12, 2003, Bowles moved to
reopen the period in which he could file his notice of appeal
pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6), which allows district court to extend
the filing deadline for fourteen days from the day the court
grants the order provided that certain conditions are met. On
February 10, 2004, the District Court granted Bowles' motion,
but rather than extending the time period by fourteen days as
the statutes allow, the District Court gave Bowles seventeen
days, until February 27, 2004, to file his notice of appeal.
Brown filed his notice on February 16, within the seventeen day
period allowed by the District Court, but after the fourteen day
period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and Section 2107(c).
The Ninth Circuit held that Bowles's notice of appeal
was untimely and that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case.
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Decision:
In a 5-4 majority opinion penned by Clarence Thomas,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth's Circuit's decision.
Thomas's analysis began by noting that “[t]his Court has long
held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is
'mandatory and jurisdictional.” He distinguished statutory time
limits from procedural rules, and also distinguished courtpromulgated rules from limits enacted by Congress. Within the
constitutional bounds, Congress has the power to determine
what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider, and
thus it can also determine “when, and under what conditions,
federal courts can hear them.” In Bowles's case, the time limit
was specifically limited by Congress in Section 2107(c), and
thus the Ninth Circuit was correct in ruling that his appeal was
untimely and it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case.
The Court held that Bowles's untimely filing could not
be excused by the “unique circumstances” doctrine. That doctrine allowed jurisdictional rules to be waived in special circumstances. The Court held that the unique circumstances
exception had not been used in forty years, it saw no need to
resurrect it, and the Court explicitly overruled two precedents
“to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule.”
Brendlin v. California
127 S. Ct. 2400
Decided June 18, 2007
Question Presented:
Is a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop
“detained” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, thus
allowing the passenger to contest the legality of the traffic stop?
Facts:
On November 27, 2001, police stopped a Buick to verify that a temporary operating permit that was displayed
matched the vehicle, despite having no articulable suspicion.
One of the officers saw a passenger in the front seat, Bruce
Brendlin, who the officer recognized as one of the “Brendlin
brothers.” The officer remembered that one of the two brothers
dropped out of parole supervision, and so he asked for the passenger to identify himself, called for backup, and verified that
Brendlin was a parole violator with an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest. When other officers arrived, Brendlin was
ordered out of the car at gunpoint and arrested. He was searched
incident to arrest, and they found an orange syringe cap on his
person, and in the car, officers found tubing, a scale, and other
things used to produce methamphetamine. Brendlin was
charged with possession and manufacture of methamphetamine, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
searches of his person and the car as fruits of unreasonable
searches, arguing that the police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. He asserted that the
traffic stop was an unlawful seizure of his person. The trial
court denied his suppression motion, finding that the stop was
lawful and Brendlin was not seized until he was ordered out of
the car and formally arrested. He pled guilty, subject to appeal
on the suppression issue.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the denial of
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Brendlin's suppression motion, holding that he was seized by
the traffic stop, which they held was unlawful. The Supreme
Court of California reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that
although the State conceded the officers had no reasonable basis
to initiate the vehicle stop, suppression was unwarranted
because a passenger is not seized as a constitutional matter
unless there are additional circumstances that would indicate to
a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the police
officer's investigation or show of authority. The court stated that
once a car was pulled over, the reasonable passenger would feel
free to depart.
Decision:
Justice David Souter wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, reversing the Supreme Court of California and
holding that a passenger is seized when the car in which he is
riding is subjected to a vehicle stop. The Court noted that its
precedents clearly held that a traffic stop entails a seizure of the
driver even where the purpose of the stop is limited, and the
resulting detention is quite brief. The Court also noted that in
Prouse and Whren, it found no difference between driver and
passenger that would affect the Fourth Amendment analysis.
Looking at the Bostick question as to whether a reasonable person would feel free to “terminate the encounter between the
police and himself” when a passenger in a vehicle stopped by
the police, the Court held that any reasonable passenger in such
circumstances would feel the police exercised “control to the
point that no one in the car was free to depart without police
permission.” (internal quotations omitted). A traffic stop curtails the travel of a passenger as much as it does a driver and just
as a driver is seized when a vehicle is stopped, so are any passengers.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN UPCOMING
CASES GRANTED CERTIORARI

Watson v. United States
Docket: 06-571
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question presented:
Where a defendant receives a gun in exchange for
drugs, has he “used” the gun under the terms of federal drug
laws?
United States v. Williams
Docket: 06-0695
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question presented:
Does the First Amendment render the PROTECT Act
unconstitutional where the Act prohibits pandering material in a
manner reflecting a belief that the material is child pornography
or is intended to cause another to believe that the material is
child pornography, and where the Act includes both images of
real children and images of realistic virtual children in its definition of child pornography?
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United States v. Santos, Efrain, and Diaz
Docket: 06-1005
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question presented:
Under 19 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1), the federal
money laundering statute, which makes it a crime to engage in
a financial transaction using the proceeds from certain illegal
activities with the intent of promoting these activities or concealing the proceeds, are proceeds the gross receipts from the
illegal activities or only the profits?

Questions Presented:
When imposing a sentence for distributing crack
cocaine, may a District Court judge consider the impact of the
100-to-1 crack/powder ratio and the Sentencing Commission's
view that the ratio leads to exaggerated sentences for crimes
involving crack cocaine? May a District Court judge, in an
effort to avoid a sentencing disparity, impose a sentence that is
below the range recommended by the 100-to-1 crack/powder
ratio in the Guidelines?
The Oyez Project, Kimbrough v. United States, (No. 06-6330),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/
2007_06_6330/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2007)

Snyder v. Louisiana
Docket: 06-10119
Louisiana Supreme Court
Questions Presented:
Did a prosecutor's reference to the O.J. Simpson murder trial prejudice an all-white jury against a black defendant
who was eventually sentenced to death? Did the lower court
ignore the import of Miller-El by failing to consider probative
evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's
repeat references to the Simpson trial, the prosecutor's use of
challenges to purge all African-Americans from the jury, the
disparate questioning of white and black prospective jurors, and
the documented pattern of the prosecutor's office diluting
minority presence in petit juries? Did the lower court err in
holding that failure to raise a Batson objection can never result
in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington?
Virginia v. Moore
Docket: 06-1082
Supreme Court of Virginia
Question Presented:
Does the Fourth Amendment require suppressing evidence obtained incident to an arrest based upon probable cause,
where the arrest violated a provision of state law?
The Oyez Project, Virginia v. Moore, (No. 06-1082), available
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1082/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
Begay v. United States
Docket: 06-11543
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Is felony driving a “violent felony” for the purposes of
the Armed Career Criminal Act?
The Oyez Project, Begay v. United States, (No. 06-11543),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/
2007/2007_06_11543/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
Kimbrough v. United States
Docket: 06-6330
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
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Logan v. United States
Docket: 06-6911
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Are convictions that do not result in loss of civil rights
excluded from the three convictions necessary to activate the
Armed Career Criminal Act's sentence enhancement?
The Oyez Project, Logan v. United States, (No. 06-6911), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/
2007_06_6911/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
Gall v. United States
Docket: 06-7949
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Question Presented:
Must district courts justify below-guideline sentences
with a finding of extraordinary circumstances? May Courts of
Appeals presume that sentences falling outside the federal sentencing guideline ranges are unreasonable?
Baze v. Rees
Docket: 07-6439
Supreme Court of Kentucky
Question Presented:
Do lethal injections in capital cases create an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?

* Jedidiah Sorokin-Altmann is a third-year law student at
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Washington, D.C. He graduated from Dartmouth College in
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